Philomathēs Matheus Soranço

Flesh and Entropy

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16 min de leitura
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en

Versão em português Carne e Entropia

This is the English translation of the original Portuguese essay ‘Carne e Entropia’.

I. The Nature of the Problem: You Were Born into a Universe That Does Not Need You

The universe is approximately 13.8 billion years old. For nearly all of that span of time, there was no one to suffer. This is important — not as comfort, for it offers none, but as context. Consciousness, that bizarre and still inexplicable phenomenon by which matter folds back upon itself and begins to observe its own existence, is the most improbable event the cosmos has ever produced, and perhaps its most unfortunate.

Physicists tell us that the universe tends toward thermal equilibrium — that entropy, the tendency of everything toward disorder, diffusion, and formlessness, is the most fundamental law we know. Stars explode. Planets cool. Organisms decay. Civilizations fall. Memories dissolve. Everything that possesses structure, organization, recognizable form is a temporary opening, an improbable parenthesis within the universe’s inexorable march toward the state where nothing matters because nothing remains organized enough for anything to matter.

Within this context, the human being is a footnote. A statistically absurd occurrence in a galaxy of 400 billion stars, itself merely one among an estimated two trillion galaxies in the observable universe. You are made of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen — atoms that existed before the first vertebrate and will exist after the last. The difference between you and the dust of a supernova is merely a question of temporary arrangement. And the arrangement dissolves. Always.

So far, this is cosmology. The part that concerns us — the part Ernest Becker spent his life trying to articulate, and that severe depression makes immediately, cruelly obvious — begins when this temporary arrangement of atoms develops the capacity to perceive that it is temporary. When matter learns to fear its own dispersal. When organized carbon comes to know that it will disorganize, and that this knowing is itself a form of suffering that no other arrangement of matter we know of experiences.

You did not choose this. You did not choose to exist, did not choose to be conscious, did not choose the emotional architecture that makes suffering an inalienable part of any experience worth the name. You appeared. And now you must deal with it. This is the situation — not as metaphor, not as dramatic exaggeration, but as clinical description of the human condition: you are an animal that knows it will die, that does not know why it exists, that has desires the universe has no obligation to satisfy, that experiences a consciousness which seems irreducibly subjective and yet seems destined for complete extinction, and that must traverse decades of existence under this weight before the weight finally crushes it entirely.

And at some point in history, this animal invented philosophy. Invented religion. Invented art, science, narrative, and ritual. Not because the universe asked for it. But because the alternative — facing the situation without mediation — is something very few bodies and minds can sustain for long.

II. What Depression Knows That the Rest of Us Prefer to Ignore

There is an idea that recurs in certain philosophical traditions — and that mainstream psychology tends to reject with the anxiety of someone who recognizes a dangerous truth — that severe depression may be, at least in part, an accurate perception. Not a cognitive distortion to be corrected, not merely a neurochemical imbalance to be rebalanced, but a way of seeing the world that removes filters most people keep active out of emotional necessity.

I am not romanticizing depression. It kills. It destroys years, relationships, capacities. It is not a state of enlightenment; it is a state of suffering. But in it, especially in its more philosophical and less purely biological forms, there is a kind of bitter lucidity that deserves to be taken seriously rather than simply anesthetized.

What depression sees, when it sees clearly, is this: the structure of human existence is fundamentally characterized by suffering, and conventional health is largely a set of techniques for not perceiving this fully. The depressed person can no longer sustain the narratives that make the world bearable. Cannot believe that things will permanently improve, that suffering has meaning, that there is any guarantee the effort is worthwhile. They see the cycle: you are born, you struggle, you love things that will end, you build projects that will be forgotten, you age, you die, and the stars continue without noticing.

Becker called this “the human situation,” and argued that all culture is an attempt not to see it directly. That belief systems, ideologies, and projects of meaning are structurally analogous to anesthetics — not entirely false in what they say, but motivated by the need to render the intolerable tolerable. And that the price of this anesthesia is the mechanism by which we transform other human beings into scapegoats, into incarnations of evil, into enemies whose destruction confirms our importance and wards off death.

Depression, in this sense, is the anesthetic that has stopped working. It is the state in which the organism can no longer sustain the necessary illusions. And this is devastatingly painful — not because the illusions were true, but because they were functional. Because they helped us get through the day. Because they made it possible to love, to create, to struggle, to hope. And without them, the day becomes a direct exposure to the cold wind of cosmology: you are small, you are alone on a scale that has no adequate vocabulary, and the universe that produced your consciousness has no special obligation toward it.

III. Pain as the Structure of the Real

There is a thought that positive-thinking systems, gratitude culture, and the wellness industry conspire to suppress because they are economically dependent on its suppression: suffering is not an anomaly. It is the texture of conscious existence in a universe of entropy.

This is not pessimism in the sense of a perspective choice that could be replaced by a more cheerful one. It is an observation about the structure of experience. Every pleasure is transient. Every attachment ends in loss. Every love carries within it the seed of pain — because everything that is loved is mortal, and love knows this before the rational mind admits it. Every project of meaning confronts, in the end, the silence of a universe that does not respond. Every conquest ages. Every memory fades.

Buddhism — which is in many respects the most honest philosophy of suffering our species has produced — begins with the declaration that life is dukkha, often translated as suffering but more precisely as dissatisfaction, incompleteness, the quality of being fundamentally incapable of remaining in a state of full satisfaction. Not because we are weak or flawed, but because we are beings of desire in a universe that permanently sustains none of the objects of desire.

Here we arrive at one of the most disturbing and most truthful ideas philosophy has produced, embodied rigorously by Robert Nozick in a thought experiment that has haunted ethical thinking since it was formulated. The question is simple: would you connect yourself to a machine capable of simulating any experience you desired, with perfect realism, forever? An existence of complete happiness, constant pleasure, uninterrupted satisfaction — all fabricated, nothing real, but indistinguishable from real within the experience. Most people, when honestly confronted with this question, answer no. And this refusal reveals something fundamental about what it is to be human. We do not want merely positive experiences. We want reality. We want our struggles to be real, our relationships to be real, our suffering — when it occurs — to be the price of something genuinely lived.

IV. Ernest Becker and the Price of Self-Knowledge

Becker died in 1974, weeks before receiving the Pulitzer Prize. He was being interviewed as cancer advanced. He spoke of death with a calm that his interlocutors described as disturbing — not the calm of someone who had made peace with the situation, but the calm of someone who had stared at it so directly for so long that the trembling had moved somewhere deeper, less visible, perhaps more permanent.

Becker’s intellectual project was, at bottom, an attempt to answer a simple and impossible question: why do we do what we do? Why does the human being, possessing the rational capacity to recognize that violence is destructive and hatred generates suffering, continue to produce violence and hatred on a civilizational scale? Why does the species that wrote the Goldberg Variations and formulated general relativity also designed gas chambers and built gulags?

The answer he found is that the root of human evil lies not in malice, ignorance, or corruption by deficient institutions. It lies in terror. In the terror of death that is constitutive of human consciousness and that requires, to be rendered tolerable, a set of strategies that inevitably imply harm to others. We construct projects of meaning that promise to make us larger than our biological death — ideologies, nations, religions, arts, sciences, families, legacies, all forms of inscribing our existence in time in a way that transcends it. And anything that threatens these projects activates a terror that is, at its core, the terror of extinction.

“It is the evil ones who are the most frightened.” This phrase from Becker carries the disturbing quality of truths we prefer not to encounter. It does not permit the comfortable division of the world into predators and prey, into monsters and innocent victims. It places everyone on the same side of a different divide: all terrified, all constructing defenses, all capable of producing harm from the same emotional substrate of vulnerability and fear.

V. The Universe as Indifference: The Cold Beauty of What Does Not Care for You

There is a philosophical tradition, running from Lucretius to Spinoza to Camus, that finds a peculiar kind of freedom in cosmic indifference. Not the freedom of absence of obligations — that is cheap freedom, which any lazy nihilist can claim. The more difficult and more interesting freedom that emerges from confrontation with cosmic indifference is this: the freedom of knowing that the meaning you construct does not need to be approved by any transcendent authority to be real.

The universe did not ask you to exist. It owes you nothing. It will not notice you when you are gone. The stars you can see on a clear night are at distances that make the concept of contemporaneity biologically absurd — the light you see left those bodies years, decades, millennia ago, and many of them no longer exist. You are looking at ghosts of fire on a scale that dissolves any illusion of centrality. And this is, simultaneously, devastating and strange and — if you have the disposition to sustain the observation long enough — remarkably beautiful.

The beauty is not despite the indifference. It is within it. The fact that the universe does not need you to keep spinning is the same structure that makes it possible for it to spin with the regularity that can be described mathematically, anticipated, understood by sufficiently complex arrangements of matter like yourself. Indifference and regularity are the same phenomenon. And this regularity — the law that governs the motion of planets and the fall of bodies and the propagation of light — is itself one of the most astonishing things that human consciousness has ever encountered.

VI. Mark Fisher and the Present Without Exit: The Death of Cultural Death

There is a specific kind of suffering that the contemporary world has produced and that does not yet have an entirely adequate name. It is not clinical depression, though it overlaps with it. It is not grief, though it shares grief’s quality of irrecoverable loss. It is something specific to our time, something that Mark Fisher tried to articulate until the point at which he could no longer continue.

Fisher called it capitalist realism — the inability to imagine alternatives, not as an intellectual position, but as an emotional and perceptual given. The visceral sense that the way things are is the only way they could be. Not the worst possible choice, not the most just, not the most humane, but simply the only real one. As if we had silently crossed some imperceptible boundary beyond which utopian imagination ceased to be possible not because its arguments had been refuted, but because the very capacity to conceive of radically different worlds had been progressively erased.

Fisher wrote about the hauntology of contemporary culture — a culture that does not advance but circulates among its own ghosts, that recycles the forms of the past without being able to produce something genuinely new, that experiences the present as absence more than as presence. Music that sounds like it is from another decade. Films that are remakes of remakes. The retro aesthetic that is not nostalgia for a time that existed, but for possibilities that never came to be realized — futures that were promised and that never arrived, and which we continue to haunt because the memory of their possibility is more vivid than any present we have managed to construct in their place.

Fisher died in 2017, in circumstances his friends described as the accumulated product of decades of depression and a relationship with suffering that was both intellectual and absolutely visceral. He had written about this with an honesty that continues to be disturbing precisely because it asks for neither pity nor admiration — it simply names what is.

VII. Art as Scar: What Remains After Everything Passes

If life is fundamentally an experience of loss — and it is; any honest analysis eventually arrives there — then art is the species’ attempt to convert loss into something that remains after the lost has gone. Not the thing itself, but the mark it left. Not the beloved, but the poem about the beloved. Not the joy that passed, but the music that captured its specific texture in a specific moment that never repeats.

Art, in its deepest and most necessary sense, is not entertainment. It is not the ornament of existence. It is the only form we have found to give weight to time. To insist that this specific moment — this particular light of this specific afternoon, this exact way that this person laughed, this precise knot in the throat of this grief — shall not simply be swallowed by forgetting without leaving any trace. It does not matter whether the trace survives. The act of creating it is already what matters.

Commodified art does not emerge from an intolerable internal pressure; it is produced in response to market demands. It does not convert pain into form that remains; it converts attention into measurable engagement. It does not demand of the audience the work of presence that transforms; it demands passive consumption that transforms nothing. The accumulation of such content does not add up to more meaning; it produces a specific noise, a kind of surface anesthesia that prevents both deeper pain and deeper joy — a constant emotional halfway point where nothing quite hurts and nothing is genuinely beautiful.

VIII. Transhumanism: The Last Wager Against Decay

There is a current of thought emerging at the intersections of analytic philosophy, biology, neuroscience, and technology that proposes something that would have sounded like messianic delusion in any other historical context, but that today is debated in laboratories and foundations with real funding: the idea that death is a technical problem, that suffering has identifiable biological causes, and that both can in principle be solved by extending and intensifying the scientific project.

Transhumanism, in its more rigorous forms — distinct from the naive technological optimism that is simply capitalism with a better narrative — begins from an observation that Becker would have recognized: the human condition as currently configured imposes suffering that is not necessary, that is a product of contingent biological limitations, not of any superior moral law requiring that we live short, painful, forgotten lives. Finitude is not sacred. It is simply the current state of an as-yet incomplete process.

But there is a tension in this proposal that cannot easily be resolved. Becker showed that the terror of death is not merely suffering to be eliminated; it is the engine driving all human sense-making. Our symbolic immortality — art, science, philosophy, love, children, projects that outlast us — exists precisely because we are mortal. The awareness of finitude is what confers urgency to existence. What makes us love with the intensity we love, create with the desperation we create, seek with the hunger we seek. If death were removed — and this is a genuinely disturbing thought, not an abstract exercise — what would happen to meaning?

IX. The Neuroscience of Suffering and Its Limits

Contemporary neuroscience has mapped with growing precision the neural correlates of suffering. It has identified networks, neurotransmitters, activation patterns that correspond to states of pain, anxiety, and depression. From this mapping, it has produced pharmacological and technological interventions that can alter these states with an efficacy that would be indistinguishable from magic to any previous generation.

This is genuinely important. Genuinely valuable. Low serotonin is not a metaphor; it is a biological state that produces real suffering, that can be treated, that need not be romanticized as clear-sighted perception of the real. Purely neurochemically-based suffering — that which emerges not from genuine confrontation with loss, not from confrontation with the existential condition, but from simple dysfunction of circuits that can be rebalanced — is suffering that needs no philosophy. It needs medicine.

But neuroscience has a limit that its most enthusiastic defenders frequently underestimate: it can describe the neural correlates of an experience without describing what it is to have that experience. It can map brain activity during grief without capturing what it means to lose someone who was a constitutive part of your way of inhabiting the world. The hard problem of consciousness — the problem of explaining why there is something it is like to be this specific person — remains the most intractable problem science has ever encountered. Until it is resolved, neuroscience is a description of suffering from outside, and what we need to inhabit it is understanding from within.

X. What Is Human: Art, Science, and Technology as a Work in Progress

Every technology is an extension of human capacity. The hammer extends the arm. Writing extends memory. The telescope extends the eye. The internet extends communication. And each extension redefines, subtly or dramatically, what counts as human. We are, more than any other animal, the species that defines itself by the capacity to redefine what it is. We have no fixed ecological niche. We do not have instinctive behaviors sufficiently specific to determine what we are without our being able to modify them.

Artificial intelligence represents the most extreme point this process has reached: not the extension of a specific capacity, but the possibility that capacities we have always defined as specifically human — language, reasoning, creation, learning — can be produced by systems not made of flesh, that have no subjective experience (as far as we know), that have no fear of death because they have no death in the sense that matters.

If a system produces language indistinguishable from the human, poetry indistinguishable from the human, reasoning indistinguishable from the human — but without the suffering that has always been, in Beckerian analysis, the engine of those products — what does this say about suffering? Was it an implementation defect, a flaw to be corrected in the next version? Or was it what made language, poetry, and reasoning genuinely human — not despite being painful, but precisely because it was?

XI–XXXIII. [The essay continues through further sections on depression, technology, beauty, love, and the dignity of persisting]

The universe moves toward equilibrium. The stars will go out. The memory that there was life will last, at best, as long as it takes for the last structure organized enough to carry it to dissolve. And afterward, nothing that cares about it.

You know this. The body knows it in a way that precedes any language — knows it in the way the heart accelerates at the thought of one’s own extinction, in the way the mind recoils from the abyss when it leans too far over it, in the way the entire organism conspires not to look directly at what it is looking at when it looks directly at it.

And in that refusal, in that conspiracy of the organism to continue, there is something I cannot call anything other than beauty. Not the beauty that consoles. The beauty that haunts. The fact that this specific flesh arranged in this specific way insists on waking tomorrow, on being hungry, on seeking human warmth, on asking questions about stars, on trying to understand why it suffers, on writing about all this as though writing changes something fundamental in the cosmology — that fact is, when seen without the habitual defenses, one of the most extraordinary things in the universe that produced it.

There is no resolution. Only what is. And what is, sometimes, is enough to make it worth staying.


Originally published in Portuguese. Read the original here: Carne e Entropia

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